Foundation of Trust

To get the benefits of e-enabled government build it to earn people's trust, so it is seen to be robust and trustworthy even when things go wrong and critical independent experts pull it apart. This has to be done consciously and in advance

Listening and the great clunking ham-fist

After the local election results the Beeb picked up a “we need to listen"meme running through all the Labour reactions (I can’t list them all, but it was endless). Good news I guess for Opinion Leader, Mori, and the other favoured pollsters. My own concern is whether what they practice really is the sort of deep, respectful listening I’ve observed in the Society of Friends, or whether it’s a sort of disrespectul, suferficial, Amstrad-like listening for the buying signals. ("Watts per channel RMS? I’ll give them watts per channel RMS...etc")

Here is, I fear, our answer, from the great clunking fist himself. What has he done wrong, asks Beeb R4 this Sunday morning?

I’ve spent too little time thinking how we can get our arguments across to the people

Noooooooooooooo no no! Too much time thinking about that. Not enough time cultivating respectful listening in the right way.

 

Look at these lovely tax details!

In cock-up Britain the tax authorities needlessly copy personal data to CDs then lose them. Clinton’s staffers stole the ‘W’s from White House keyboards when the apparently perfectly intelligent George Bush 2 took over at US&A. In Machiavellian Italy an outgoing administration deliberately posts everyone’s tax details, including salary, on the web (in this extraordinary story from the Beeb), apparently to poke Berlusconi in the eye.

Openness about tax is the norm in Scandinavia, but a complete shocker for Italians. Tax-dodging is somewhere between rife and socially acceptable in Italy. The outgoing administration must have been exasperated beyond reason at the thought of a crooked tax dodger getting back into power.

We knew the vast mounds of personal data held often unnecessarily by government were already at risk from nitwits and criminal insiders. We’d better add “piqued outgoing administrations” to the list of risks.

Wibbi government reduced its risk and liability by minimising its holdings of non-essential personal data, anonymising wherever possible, and encrypting the small proportion it is essential to keep? Not that it would have helped Italy here.

Wibbi the technical immortality attributed to Silvio Berlusconi were quickly proved to be a phantasm? Or is that unkind...he is entertaining, in a John Prescottey sort of way.

Wibbi we could take the best of Italy and and the best of Scandinavia and be enlightened and responsible with decent weather, good food and sublime artistic sensibility and sense of humour to boot? Well, we can but ask…

 

Rubbish Japanese fingerprint video

Why is it that the spooky biometrics junkies who want to fingerprint, register and scan us make such rubbish, stilted videos which just feel like lies? And why do they use such satanic muzak? See

Suddenly Japan is added to the list of countries we have to find excuses to avoid visiting. Why is it that the antis have all the humanity, all the best gags and all the media skills? And feel as if they’re telling the truth? And who is more worthy of our trust - the stilted fibbers or the confident, empathetic artists with rocking taste in music?

 

Security & society: please answer me one simple question

Just back from an IBM “deep dive” into the deep and vexed question of security and society. IBM makes a considerable effort with these, inviting a couple of dozen external people to each of a series of eight events looking at trillion dollar questions with wide social and geographic impact. This is a demanding task, rigorously cross-disciplinary, and ideally needing government input. To work, it needs corporate participants to have gone through some sort of Cluetrain Manifesto metamorphosis (ie to speak in a natural voice not a corporate one) plus a dynamic and energising process and environment (as I write these very words our facilitator joins me in the Tegel Business lounge, we get into good conversation and I nearly miss my plane).

I think my reflections are of three sorts:

- how we approach the exam topic: security and society (see below)
- IBM culture and the culture of security (to follow here)
- the heart of Berlin, what it means and how it has changed (to follow on personal blog)

We met in the very plush Hotel Adlon in Berlin, the reconstructed bombed-out 1920s building on a site by the Brandenburg Gate that lay between East and West, next to the Holocaust memorial, and heavily fortified British and US Embassies.

Parts of the conversation I was frankly uncomfortable with; I’m sure I contributed a fair measure of discomfort. That’s probably no bad thing. I sensed, perhaps unfairly, that we had to fight a “shallow-dive” instinct to look for rich clients with branded security problems to which solutions could profitably be applied. There were hushed conversations about the eye-watering growth in markets for automated analysis of surveillance output and guileless suggestions about how we could derive extra revenues by extracting marketing data from security cameras in shopping malls.

Security people have to be matter-of-fact about unpleasant things. They take refuge in euphemisms, and label or brand their enemies so the threat is more clearly defined. But sometimes they seem hard-wired with dangerously wrong assumptions. We heard that only 2000 people had been “affected” by the World Trade Centre attack, and that we have yet to see the results when something “really significant” happens. In this Weltauffassung ”AQ” is the mainspring of our thinking; the driving business need against which we sell products and services. But...but...but...2000 people were killed in New York; literally millions have been directly “affected”. Meanwhile what has happened in the Congo, Iraq and elsewhere - Katrina, tsunami - is already “really significant”. Hey, there are food riots in six countries as we speak: is that not significant?

Let’s not have a world in which dangerous fringe religious fanatics set priorities for us. Let’s think harder, set our own priorities, and act to pre-empt less enlightened people.

There’s a sense of “our” security. But who are “they”? Who are we frightened of? Why are they scared of us? Aren’t we all in this together?

My alternate reading list for Berlin started with Oxford Research Group’s analysis of the greatest causes of global and regional instability and large-scale loss of life. The top four are:
- Climate change
- Competition over resources
- Marginalisation of the majority world
- Global militarisation

Terrorism - by AQ or anyone else - is terrible, and criminal. But ORG’s evidence does not place it among the top four threats. ORG goes on to argue that our responses to these threats fall broadly into two sorts (tho I note the argument of the radiantly expectant Prof Sadie Creese that these are interrelated):

1. control paradigm – an attempt to maintain the status quo through military means and control insecurity without addressing the root causes, or
2. sustainable security - cooperatively resolve the root causes of those threats using the most effective means available

Note: don’t call the second option “soft”. There’s nothing soft at all about hardcore pacificts. Pulling triggers is easy. Putting up walls or CCTV is easy. Love is hard.

So, my question, which I sought several times without success to have asked, is this:

What is the proportion of our resources (time, money, people, effort, thinking, innovation, technology) we currently put into the first sort of security vs the second? And if we were being entirely rational and evidence-based about the risks we face and the realistic possibilities of our actions having any effect on them, what proportion would we put into the first, and what into the second?

I wasn’t able to persuade the organisers to put this question to the group on the day. So I’ll try now, after the event, to do so alongside the group thank-you emails that are going round. Glad of your comments. Just click “comments” if you’re not already on the comments page, cut the bit below, paste it & complete the percentages (50:50, 80:20, 100:0 or whatever) below:

% of our time/money/resources/innovation effort…
----------------------------
...that we currently invest in
Control paradigm today ---%
Sustainable security today ---%

...that rationally we should invest (once we’e thought about it and considred the evidence) in
Control paradigm ---%
Sustainable security ---%

(Answers are impressionistic. “We” can mean you, your company, country, or the world - it doesnt matter which)

 

Does this InfoCards press release qualify PR person Kersti as a possible IdealGov author?

What do you do if an email appears in your intray from someone called Kersti Klami? I should add the subject line is perfectly repeatable in polite company. Anyway, I opened it and had a look. It turns out that she is a PR person working for some company called Racehorse or Fusion or something. Here’s what she has to say:

 

ID: bid risk and the vulnerability of IPS

According to an August 2007 article in the FT, contracts will be awarded for suppliers to the NIS this Spring. Now. But will any suppliers bid? After all:

• The NIS may turn out to be a smaller system than suppliers expected and there may be less money to make out of it as a result. Crosby has ruled that the high volume of transactions that go through the banks and the big retailers are not on the menu. There is no reason for suppliers to expect the NIS to be involved in DWP benefit claims nor in the health service nor education. Scotland may refuse to use the NIS, and Wales, too. Its advocates always claim that the NIS will be used to prove everyone’s right to work in the UK but IPS failed to provide the ID checking service they promised. And it may be that, far from everyone aged 16 and over, only certain sections of the population will be fingerprinted.

• The timescales are stretching. Far from starting at the end of 2009, as previously planned, the NIS will not start to be rolled out in earnest now until 2012. And given IPS’s track record, suppliers would be well advised to allow for more delays.

• As the economy dips, people will want more assurance that their stealth tax money is being well spent. Hard to provide that assurance, when a number of prospective suppliers have already pulled out of the bidding, the House of Commons Science and Technology Committee are just as unimpressed with IPS’s plans as Crosby and the biometrics on which the NIS depends are unreliable.

• There are alternatives to the NIS. Identity assurance could be provided by the banks and/or the mobile phone companies and/or the utility companies and/or the credit referencing agencies. The NIS could become irrelevant. These other systems could be more effective and could come on-stream earlier than IPS’s 15-year timetable – a surprisingly relaxed timetable, given that we’re talking here about the UK’s response to crime and terrorism.

• Suppliers to the NIS would be victims of the lack of trust in the government identified by Crosby – they would be tarred with the same brush.

• IPS is not some unstoppable behemoth with a mandate to monitor everyone in the UK. On the contrary, it is a supplicant, in sales talks with prospective customers, and it hasn’t closed a single deal yet.

• Suppliers will be dependent on IPS and IPS are vulnerable. They are dependent on Labour and Labour treat the NIS like a political football. If the Lib Dems or the Conservatives come to power, the NIS will be cancelled, as its equivalent was in Australia, and suppliers cannot expect to be bailed out.

So now how sensible does it look for a supplier to invest in this project? Which sensible chief executive would commit the funds? Why? What return is sensibly to be expected? What price risk?

(This article is the summary of a longer paper on the subject, ‘A risk assessment for prospective suppliers to the UK NIS’, which first saw the light of day on IdealGovernment.com in November 2007.)

 

Is this “security & society index” the right start point for creating ideal e-enabled government?

Thanks to my good mate JJ I’ve been invited to an interesting-looking session in Berlin looking at “security & society”. I’m looking forward to it, and wondering what sort of homework to do. Our hosts have sent over some facts to get us thinking. It’s worked. They’ve got me thinking. Whaddyerreckon?

Security and Society Index
The below is a cross-section of statistics to provide context for some of the key issues on the topic of security.

Personal Security
Closed-circuit television (CCTV) cameras in public places in the U.K.: 5 million
Average number of times a Briton is filmed on CCTV in one day: 300
Crime reduction in UK credited to CCTV: 5%
Americans using the same password for most online accounts: 63%
Average number of people with access to a patient’s records during a hospitalization: 150
Computers that are daily controlled by malicious bots: 40%
Unique samples of malicious software discovered in 2007: 5 million
Increase in number of unique samples of malicious software over 2006: 5X
Average time before an unprotected online computer becomes infected with a virus: 20 minutes
Hours of victim’s personal time required to reclaim stolen identity: 600

Commercial Security
Personal-data records compromised by security breaches last year: 162 million
Total arrests made in conjunction with these security breaches: 19
Cost to companies per compromised record last year: $197
Estimated cost of all compromised records last year: $32 billion
Size of the worldwide security software market in 2007: $9.1 billion
Growth rate of security costs over IT budgets: 3X
Total losses worldwide due to phishing attacks last year: $3 billion
Estimated cyber crime market size: $100 billion
Global mobile operators hit by mobile device infections last year: 83%
IT executives who do not monitor their databases for suspicious activity: 40%
Organizations worldwide that have separate information security departments: 27%
Cost of corporate espionage to the world’s 1,000 largest companies: $45 billion
Corporate security breaches perpetrated by employees or contractors: 70%

Societal Security
Number of people crossing national borders every second: 25
Average Foreign Direct Investment loss due to increase risk of terrorism: $16 billion
Potential economic impact per 100,000 persons of a bioterrorist attack: $26.2 billion
Cost to vaccinate 100,000 people against such attack: $16.3 million
Total costs per 100,000 lives caused by all natural disasters worldwide in 2003: $22 billion
Annual number of people given terrorist risk-assessment scores by the USA’s Automated
Targeting System: 431 million
Accuracy of Automated Targeting System: 99.9%
Annual number of false alarms by Automated Targeting System: 431,000
Reduction of Middle East & South Asia’s Internet capacity due to damaged undersea cable: 70%
Duration of YouTube.com’s global outage due to interference by Pakistani government: 2 hours

What I want to take to Berlin is a good set of facts but above all the right frame of mind to have a constructive discussion about the ideal way to get to secure e-enabled society. There’s more to it than I can yet see here. 

 

Return-to-work freelancer gets unceremoniously flamed in The Reg

El Reg invited me to do my first piece of frelance journalism for several years - an article about Microsoft’s acquisition of Stefan Brands’ U-Prove work. I was never a brilliant journalist and I’m a bit rusty; the piece was longwinded and late. The Reg’s readers give pretty short shrift to most things anyway.

In the dozen or so comments, readers are offended by the suggestion that Jacqui Smith the Home Secretary is a pretty smart woman. Anonymous Coward retorts, for example

Her utterances in post have been utterly without personality; and her entire career would fit better with the theory she’s an energetic loyalist slogger not an imaginitive thinker.

Eponymous Cowherd takes a similar view.

The fact is that few politicians would score that well in a test on tech issues which the average Reg reader would sail through. But they’re called on to apply themselves more or less to every issue Parliament debates or that their constituents come up with. They’re ultimate generalists. I can’t produce Jacqui Smith’s examn results to defend my remarks but I stand by the sentiment that you dont get to be Britain’s first woman Home Secretary without being a smart woman. Furthermore, we won’t get the chance to put to her how important these developments in Internet security and privacy are if we approach her in a dismissive and insulting way. We’ve got to the stage where the intelligent generalist needs to understand the importance of privacy-enhancing technologies in general and minimum disclosure tokens in particular. We need to think carefully how to engage in that conversation.

Meanwhile jubtastic1 and others haul me up, with some justification, for not explaining Dr Brands limited disclosure credentials very clearly. On rereading the article I think that’s a fair cop. Sorry! It’s not insulting to anyone to say 99.9% of us will never understand the maths of Stefan’s solutions - I have a maths A-level and I couldn’t even name the symbols in many of his equations let alone prove whether they add up correctly to something to which I can entrust my personal details online.

Stefan did patiently explain U-Prove to me in a new and different way with analogies based on soap bars with shapes stamped underneath. The problem, as I said, is that he’s solved an emerging problem which, though serious and real, has no simple analogy in the tangible world. Nor does his solution have an analogy in the visible and tangible world; a number of its benefits are counterintuitive.

I guess his video animations are a helpful explanation to which I should have linked earlier. But I have to make it clear again to those who want to _really_ understand his work I’m not the man who can help. I dont _really_ understand it. Anyway, it’s not me that matters, and the world’s cyptographers are not the only ones who matter. Jacqui Smith matters. Ollie Letwin understood it when a FIPR colleague and I explained it to him a few years ago (and a half-hour meeting lasted 90 minutes). The challenge is: how can we ensure the importance of this is put to the Home Secretary? How can it be done in a way that is persuasive?

 

Steady progress by the forces of sanity

No2ID pulled off a major coup with its mayoral hustings. Ken didnt show up and was branded a coward by the-man-whom-Ministers-are forbidden-from-calling-Boris, who promised to cut his ID card and “sprinkle it on my cornflakes”. Details from BBC below.

And CAAT has won a High Court ruling that the Government acted unlawfully when it curtailed a corruption investigation into BAE Systems’ Al Yamamah arms deals with Saudi Arabia.

 

Can the ICS avoid the classic largescale IT project design problems?

DCSF recently published a summary of an evaluation of the Integrated Children’s System (ICS), which raises a number of significant issues for the continued and successful implementation of the scheme by local authorities. The research, carried out by York University and funded by the department draws attention to:

 

ID: outstanding questions on The Benighted Scheme

I dont really get this. An eyewitness made a contempory note of Meg Hillier telling the Home Affairs Select cttee

The National Identity Register, essentially, will be a secure database; ...hack-proof, not connected to the Internet...not be accessible online; any links with any other agency will be down encrypted links.

I understand the officials present were passing notes to try to get her back on message. What appears in the official record is is

The National Identity Register, essentially, will be a secure database; it will not be accessible online; any links with any other agency will
be down encrypted links.

Why ws that toned down? If it’s not accessible online what is the use of it? Will people have to send CDs to each other? But if it is linked live to other agencies isnt that online?

Also, now we’re procuring the damn thing, do we know what will be on the card? Do we know how people authenticate the card, and what they can check?

I suspect it’s too much to try to get answers to all these questions. What would be really great is if we could get a list of all the outstanding questions about how the Benighted Scheme is supposed to work. Vey glad of any help and thoughts. Delighted to get contributions and clarifications form our loyal readers inside IPS.

 

Good dinner with bad memes

I can’t reveal the identity or affiliation of any participant at the tasty and interesting dinner I attended last night. I believe (under the revised Rule) I can say it was at the House of Lords. I can definitely say there are some very dodgy memes flying around.

One is the notion that we can decline to “buy into” the European legislative framework and case law behind the UK’s data protection act and data sharing plans. The European Convention on Human Rights and Data Protection directive have legal force here. We can’t just dismiss them as Euro-constiutional claptrap, insufficiently pragmatic for us Brits (any more than I can say I think our laws on tax or whatever aren’t quite right and that I don’t really “buy into them").

Another is a distinct, probably unintended but seriously wrong elitist vibe which suggests it’s intolerable for the media to intrude into the lives of those who run the country, therefore the top 5% need extreme protection from revelations about their private lives. But when conversation turns to hoi polloi people are spoken of as immigrant tax-dodging scroungers of social services and healthcare. Our national situation is one requiring monolithic ID management and a toxic soup of data sharing. Facing the national problems we do a general loss of privacy isn’t a great price to pay. 

People who desperately need a giro cheque will give away any amount of personal information to feed the kids. That’s why they need every bit as much statutory and practical privacy protection as anyone else. We’re all in this together. Just as we’re equal in the eyes of the law so too the systems we create must be good enough for one and all of us in how they protect our personal data and leave us in control of our own lives.

By all means put casual service-sector workers in businesses with 125% staff turnover (Rentokil, apparently) on 50% emergency tax rates while the employers and the system works out who they are, and that they haven’t claimed their allowances already.

The other weird meme is this self-repairing bubble of mutual self-congratulation. Reasonable people tell you in all seriousness that everything is fine and that Whitehall generally and the CIO profession in particular is doing a great job. The same people will reel off a list of dire specific shortcomings, whether it’s procurement processes, large government web sites, political interference, Transformational Government, Connecting for Health, DirectGov search. But as fast as they acknowledge specific shortcomings, the bubble of self-belief self-heals. I can’t work that one out. Surely there are some mistaken assumptions underlying this?

 

The individual as a business; the citizen as Ministry

Check this out from Alan Mitchell’s “right side up” buyer-centric commerce forum:

The individual as a business

There is a simple question at the heart of person-centric commerce: whose profitability are we trying to improve? In our current organisation-centric world, there is only one answer to this question: the organisation. But now there is another answer: the individual.

Today, big businesses employ armies of advisors, consultants and agents to help them achieve their goals and act on their behalf. They reward these advisors, consultants and agents to the extent and degree that they help the business achieve what it wants to achieve: improved performance, increased profitability etc.

Right Side Up businesses and services bring the same approach to individuals. Individuals pay them to help them achieve their goals more efficiently and more effectively and to act on their behalf – to help them improve their performance and increase their profitability *.

This talk about ‘personal profitability’ is not just metaphorical, it’s literal too. The Right Side Up service addresses each individual as a legitimate business in its own right, because it recognises that individuals do all the things businesses do.

* Of course, one of the big differences between big organisations and individuals is that individuals define ‘performance’ and ‘profitability’ in many different ways. ‘Profit’ may be emotional rather than financial, for example.

Like any business, the individual:

* sets strategies to achieve goal, sources inputs, processes them into outputs or desired outcomes etc.

* has to manage many different departments or functions: my home, my health, my money, my transport, my communications etc. Naturally, the individual wants to run these departments better.

* manages many processes to do this: set goals, make plans, set priorities, make decisions, conduct exchanges and transactions, do work, coordinate activities, oversee logistics, administer things, keep records, and so on.

* invests assets such as time, money, energy and attention in managing these departments and processes – and naturally seeks the best possible return on these investments.

Right Side Up services bring professional expertise and specially designed infrastructure to help individuals improve their performance and profitability on all these fronts. Organisations that view and treat individuals as customers of their particular organisation, buying particular products and services, simply cannot ‘see’ this potential.

That’s a fantastic statement of the sort of “corrective” thinking we need to apply to Transformational Government to make it work and to make public services that are respectful of human dignity.

 

Patient Opinion: you can’t fool a good SRO

Picked up by the IdealGov concealed microphones at a recent CIO meeting, spoken (it would seem) by the senior responsible officer for spending £25m a year of taxpayers’ money on NHS Choices

“You should see this other site...”

Quite right. NHS Choices’ “voice” function promises to be more expensive and less well moderated than the existing and simple-to-use Patient Opinion. But most serious of all, it won’t be independent at all. The idea is we voluntarily voice our feedback via NHS Choices into a crown copyright publi-private partnership, so future secretaries of state can use our data to make politicised editorials and some outfit like Dr Fosters can mine it as intellectual property. Je pense pas; non, noooooon, non! Geklauten Daten? Nein Danke!

Wibbi: we applied all three core IdealGov principles in one go here. We score a quick win, we use a process of co-creation, and dig deep to build gov 2.0 on a foundation of trust. All we have to do is use the money we’re going to waste on some arm-manufacturing contractor writing a £multi-million Transport-Direct/DirectGov/BusinessLink type EU-rules procured NHS Choices/Voices clunketerium web site. Instead we could use a fifth the money to promote and roll out the creative-commons and not-for-profit Patient Opinion faster. At the very least we could remove the “planning blight” NHS Chioices/Voices casts on Patient Opinion, which works nationally already with simple clean design, exemplary tagging, moderation and flexible feedback options.

JFDDI! Desist! The senior officials know it makes sense. I think the Minister in charge is Dawn Primarolo (not Ben Bradshaw. Or Alan Johnson is top dog at health.) Gordon - have a word would you? [Thought: perhaps we could install an IdealGov-branded Middlesboro’-style talking CCTV camera in #10, so we can keep an eye on the PM and also offer him some top tips at convenient moments 24/7]

 

Biometric Bus Pass Arrives, but not as ID

My new “biometric” bus pass card finally arrived this morning – complete with a 16 page book of confusing rules which basically says that the rules are very complicated so we should always “ask the driver” whether our cards are valid for each particular journey!

For example, it seems that we can travel from the hospital in the next county before 09:30 or after 23:00; but not from the closer hospital in our county town! With a “companion” we can apparently travel to/from a much more distant specialist hospital; something we apparently cannot do alone!

In spite of the expense of this new scheme, this new card is little use as ID: Unlike the previous bus pass, this one has no space for the user’s signature (the back is covered with yet more rules). Also, the “passport grade” photo they demanded will often not look like the user – eg. No spectacles etc.

Surprisingly, in this era of “social inclusion” there are two types and colours of card – although both have exactly the same benefits: The “elderly” have a wide red stripe and the “disabled” have an orange stripe.

Wibbis:
1. New initiatives occasionally made life simpler!
2. Officialdom was not so keen on inventing new rules.
3. Some thought had been given to producing a multi-purpose card.

 
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BLOGS etc
Bruce Schneier
Jeff Jonas, IBM
Jerry Fishenden
Headshift
Ian Brown
Kim Cameron, MS
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Public strategist
Richard Allan
Robin Wilton, Sun
Sam Smith
Stefan Brands, Credentica
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Swizz of the cards
Handelsman: NSA wiretaps
Handelsman: US spying
Wearcam
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ESSENTIALS

Cluetrain Manifesto
RAE Dilemmas of Privacy
NCC Playlist for public services
Sousveillance
Stefan Brands' book summary
Ross Anderson book

Engelbart Mother of all demos
OTHER ID/SECURITY
ID theft spy
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Home Office ID cards
Credentica
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...and the original
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