WRITTEN ON July 19th, 2005 BY William Heath AND STORED IN Identity

I can’t say who said it or where but I got a pretty clear insight yesterday into government thinking on the ID legislative process. See below.

I hope that sheds some light on the matter. Fans of Punch & Judy meanwhile can look forward to more political ding-dong. “The firefight with the LSE will continue,” we are promised on good authority.

The word is they don’t want to insult everyone’s intelligence. They apologise for overenthusiasm in overselling the card in the past. The leitmotiv of standing committee is the notion of canard. Canard in this context means a phoney objection. Canards can be dismissed out of hand before we get down to the real debate. Here is, I think, a full list of the canards mentioned. I’ve added my own comments to each.

“This is rushed/hurried/done without proper thought.” (tho based on a paper dating back to 2002 and despite over a dozen standing committee sessions)

But it’s quite clear the standing committee won’t have time, for example, to consider costs properly. The process would have been better had government released its costing assumptions. Also no time has been spent evaluating better alternatives. We want a flexible safe transport system and we’re being sold one steamroller.

“It fundamentally alters the relationship between citizen and state.”

I feel different about being compulsorily registered, scanned, charged, and required to produce this, and knowing there’s a new database with the pattern of my life over which I have no control. If I feel it’s a different relationship, that makes it different. That’s what relationships are like.

“It attacks civil liberties.”

Civil liberties experts seem to agree it does, and that we still need to understand better just how it will work.

“It leads to a ‘Can I see your papers please’ society.”

This is a canard. We established already at an earlier Chatham House session there’s no need to carry a card as long as you’re still attached to your fingers or eyeballs. The police or tax man can simply require a fingerprint and check you against the register.

“It’s againat ECHR.”…when every advice says it isn’t.

*Sigh* Every advice the government gets says it isnt. Every advice the NGOs get says it is. What are we to make of this – that you get what you pay for? At the least this remains contentious, so cannot be simply dismissed.

“Biometrics don’t work and will never work.”

Nobody says biometrics don’t work. Clearly they do. The question is just how well; I think we all accept that they are not perfect. So the argument is about managing the risk in the zone of failure and exclusion. Some of us will always regard them as intrusive and punitive, so acceptable for convicted criminals only. And while the intention of using them is to distinguish, they do also discriminate against certain groups as the Atos/PA trials showed

“You said it’s cost £85 and then you said £93.” The government has promised to come back with its early thoughts on fees and concessions.

But the issue isn’t cover price and concessions. The issue is the cost to the country of the whole undretaking, and the quantifiable benefits. The Home Office just won’t publish its costings which are essential to understand how they see it working and what assumptions it is making about takeup, usage etc. The LSE published its assumption, calculated using a model developed by Kable. And Kable published its own estimates. The Home Office promises that it will rubbish these in due course. When we have more information the estimates can be improved. The fact is that the confusion about costs and just how the system will work gives an unfortunate impression that the Home Office is being eith wooly or deliberately duplicitous aobut its intentions. This makes the project more expensive, because suppliers will base their costs on a percepyion of risk. The Home Office cites commercial confidentiality and prejudice ot the procurement process as resons not to be open about costs. That just doesn’t wash. Industry wants clarity. The best way to achieve a robust competitive process is good market information which reduces risk.

“Labour overspins and underdelivers.”

*Sigh* That sort of comment is for a politician to make and a for politician to respond to, not me.

UPDATE: This is confirmed today in answer to Mark Oaten’s question of 7 July whether the Home Secretary will publish his Department’s technical evaluation of the LSE work on ID cards. Charles Clarke’s answer: “A technical evaluation of the London School of Economics report will be published shortly.” (18 July)